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ABSTRACT 
 
The following article tests the wealth-building nature of derivatives usage in non-financial firms.  
Investigating 434 firms and employing univariate and multivariate tests, it uses both the fair 
values and notional values of firms’ derivatives contracts to determine whether derivatives usage 
enhances or destroys firm value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he large and ever-increasing number of firms using derivative instruments invites the question: does 
derivative usage add value to the firm?  At the heart of this question is the presumed professional and 
ethical duty of financial management, stockholder wealth maximization.  This study investigates the 
relationship between firm value and derivative usage by non-financial firms.   
 
 According to Modigliani and Miller’s capital structure irrelevance principle, the value of a firm is 
independent of its risk management policies and behavior.  However, the capital structure irrelevance principle only 
stands in the absence of frictions (noise) in an efficient market (wherein all available information is known by the 
investor).  When real world frictions such as asymmetric information, bankruptcy costs, taxes, and costly external 
financing are introduced, the perfect market on which the Modigliani and Miller model depends disappears, and the 
door is opened for value-adding risk management policy.   Among these frictions, derivative instruments possess the 
opportunity to add value. 
 
 This study is presented in two sections.  The first section reviews relevant literature, including theoretical 
and empirical research on the determinants of firms’ hedging policies and empirical research on the real value effect 
of derivatives hedging policies.  The second section presents the empirical research conducted by this study, 
including univariate and multivariate tests of both the fair values and notional values of firms’ derivative contracts.   
 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
 Early research on derivative usage as a hedging option focuses on the frictions that allow derivatives to add 
value.  Both theoretical and empirical research has been published on the reasons why firms choose to hedge using 
derivatives.  Smith and Stulz’s 1985 paper stands among the early literature on the subject.  Using mathematical 
models, the authors find that by reducing the variability of pre-tax firm value, derivative hedging can increase the 
after-tax value of the firm if the transaction costs of the derivatives employed are less than the increase in value.  
They also find that, by reducing the future variability of firm value, derivative usage can decrease the expected costs 
of bankruptcy.
 
   
 
 Adding to the literature on the incentives for hedging, Bessembinder [1991] finds that derivative usage can 
reduce underinvestment, as follows:   
 
By shifting individual future states from default to nondefault outcomes, hedges increase the proportion of future 
states in which equity holders are the residual claimants. This reduces the fraction of the benefit from incremental 
T 
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investment that accrues to nonequity claimants, thereby reducing incentives for equity holders to underinvest. (p. 
531) 
 
Bessembinder also discovers that the use of derivative hedging (especially continual hedging) can increase the 
contract terms of the firm’s debt.  Extending Bessembinder’s findings, Leland [1998] reveals that derivatives allow a 
firm to increase its debt capacity.   He concludes that while equity holders lose value to bond holders by increasing a 
firm’s leverage through derivatives hedging, the increased debt provides income-increasing tax benefits that more 
than offset the value lost to bond holders.  Finally, DeMarzo and Duffie [1995] theorize that hedging policies reduce 
noise, thereby allowing investors to make better portfolio decisions with regard to risk management.  In addition to 
the body of theoretical research on the incentives for firms to hedge with derivatives, a substantial amount of 
empirical work on the subject also exists.   
 
 Of the empirical research on hedging incentives, some studies support theory while others reject it.  
Continuing Smith and Stulz’s theoretical work on reducing financial distress costs, Purnanandam [2008] studies a 
sample of 2,256 non-financial, non-utility firms, finding that financially distressed firms, in highly concentrated 
industries, do, in fact, hedge more.  Geczy et al. [1997], in their study of 372 of the Fortune 500 non-financial firms 
in 1990 find that higher quick ratios (a measure of immediately available internal funds) are associated with a lower 
probability of hedging.  The study also finds that firms with more growth opportunities (as reflected through greater 
R&D expense) have an increased probability of hedging.  This suggests that hedging is used to ensure the 
availability of internal funds for future projects, especially when the firm is financially constrained.  Contrary to 
most literature in the field, Bartram et al. [2009] reject many of the derivative usage determinant theories.  Their 
results do not support the underinvestment hypothesis (R&D and capital expenditures are negatively correlated with 
hedging) nor the financial distress hypothesis (derivative users are found to be larger and more profitable than non-
users).  They suggest that previous research lacks the power of their study, which includes 7,319 non-financial firms, 
a sample that “covers about 80% of global market capitalization of nonfinancial firms” (p. 186).   While a plethora 
of research exists on the determinants of firm’s hedging policies, and how the use of derivatives can increase firm 
value, not until recently has research been conducted on how derivative usage affects firm value.   
 
 Only a few studies take the determinants of firms’ hedging policies one step further and investigate whether 
or not a firm’s decision to hedge increases its value.   In a study conducted by Allayannis and Weston [2001], a 
sample of 720 non-financial firms exposed to foreign exchange rate risk is analyzed using Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
firm value.  The results suggest that firm value is related positively to derivative usage with a 4.87 percent premium 
placed on hedging.  Nelson et al. [2005] examine stock price performance and derivative usage for over 5770 firms.  
The results support the hypothesis that firms that hedge using derivatives are valued higher (stock price performs 4.3 
percent per year on average better than that of firms that don’t use derivatives).  However, they also find that the 
increased performance is driven largely by currency derivatives.  In fact, currency derivatives are the only type of 
hedge that produces gains for the firm.  Pramborg [2004] analyzes foreign exchange exposure specifically for 
Swedish non-financial firms and finds that hedging transaction exposure is value-adding, while hedging translation 
exposure is not.  Graham and Rogers [2002], in investigating tax incentives for corporations to hedge, find that 
derivatives increase a firm’s debt ratio by an average of 3 percent, which contributes to a 1.1 percent increase in firm 
value (in the form of tax shields).  Adam and Fernando [2006] find that derivative hedging by gold and silver mining 
companies increases the firms’ cash flows.  Because the increased cash flows are not met with a greater risk 
exposure, the derivative usage has a positive effect on firm value.  The study also finds that “selective hedging,” in 
which managers slip some speculation into their “hedging” strategy, provides a significant increase in cash flows.  
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins [2006], in a study of 28 airlines, find that hedging jet fuel prices using derivative 
contracts has a positive effect on firm value.  The study finds a hedging premium of between five and ten percent, 
which it largely attributes to the increase in availability of internal funds for investment opportunities.  Finally, Clark 
and Judge [2009] study a sample of 412 non-financial firms ranked in the top 500 firms in the UK based on market 
value at year-end 1995.  They find that when foreign currency (FC) derivatives are employed, either as the sole FC 
risk management tool or in conjunction with FC debt, they are value enhancing.   
 
 Hagelin, Holmén, Knopf, and Pramborg [2007] and Jin and Jorion [2006] continue the research into the 
value effect of derivatives but find inconclusive (statistically insignificant) results.  Hagelin et al. perform three 
tests: an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a Treatment Effects regression, and a two-stage least squares 
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(2SLS) regression.  While all three tests return a positive correlation between hedging and firm value, only the OLS 
and Treatment Effects regressions contain statistically significant results.  Jin and Jorion find dissimilar results.  
Their study of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers finds that, while derivative usage is successful in reducing the 
sensitivity of stock prices to oil and gas prices, it does not increase firm value.  To the contrary, most of the tests 
result in a negative relationship between derivative usage and firm value.  While none of these results is statistically 
significant, other studies have shown a statistically significant negative value effect for derivative usage. 
 
 Nguyen and Faff [2010], find that hedging interest rates with derivatives has a negative impact on firm 
value.  However, in their study of 428 Australian firms, the authors cannot suggest with statistical significance that 
foreign currency derivatives or commodities derivatives affect firm value.  Ben Khediri [2010], in a sample of 250 
non-financial French firms from 2000 to 2002, finds similar results to those of Nguyen and Faff.  The study finds 
that the decision to use any type of derivative for hedging purposes is associated with a 26.3 percent lower market 
value (significant at the ten percent level).  Ben Khediri attributes the results to the difference in analyst and investor 
perceptions regarding derivative usage in France compared to those in the U.S.  While much of the empirical 
research on the question of how derivative usage affects the value of non-financial firms suggests a positive 
relationship, the question is by no means answered.  As seen above, some of the most recent literature suggests that 
derivative usage has a negative effect on firm value.  The current paper expands the literature with an analysis of the 
effects of derivative usage on firm value in a more contemporary sample of non-financial firms. 
 
DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
 The sample data set for this study includes the S&P 500 from February 2011.  The S&P 500 represents a 
broad-based index that is generally considered a reasonably accurate spread of U.S. firms across industries.  
Financial depository institutions, financial nondepository institutions, and securities and commodities brokers are 
excluded, as they are outside the scope of this study.  The distinction between financial and non-financial firms was 
determined by companies’ primary two-digit SIC codes.  Thirty banks and fourteen securities and commodities 
brokers were excluded.  Firms that were on the S&P 500 in February 2011 but that did not have a 2009 annual report 
in the MergentOnline database were also excluded.  This amounted to eleven firms.  In total, 434 firms are included 
in the main sample.  Thirty-four firms were removed from the sample used in the notional values tests due to a lack 
of data in the firms’ annual reports, resulting in a total sample size of 400 for those tests. 
 
 Of the 434 firms, 328 firms (75.6%) use derivative instruments (24.4% do not use derivatives).  Of those 
328 firms, 88 use only derivatives designated as hedges (27% of derivative users) and 66 use only derivatives not 
designated as hedges (19% of derivative users);  179 firms use both derivatives designated and not designated as 
hedges (54% of all derivative users). 
 
 This study tests whether derivative usage by non-financial firms is significantly related to firm value using 
univariate tests and multivariate regression models.  Univariate tests find both the mean and median a modified 
Tobin’s Q (defined below and using book value rather than replacement cost) for firms that do not use derivatives 
(non-users), firms that use only derivatives designated as hedging instruments (designated users), firms that use only 
derivatives not designated as hedging instruments (non-designated users), and all firms that use derivatives (users).  
These tests use the fair value of firms’ derivative usage rather than the notional value of derivative usage as the use 
of fair value data allows for the separation of designated users from non-designated users and includes a larger 
sample (434 observations versus 400). 
 
 The data are further investigated using an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator.  Firm value is regressed 
against derivative usage (FV against DERX).  This gives the simple univariate regression equation, 
 
                                 
 
where   is a constant and the vertical axis intercept;    , is firm value for any given value,  , expressed as (Market 
Value of Equity + Book Value of Liabilities) divided by (Book Value of Equity + Book Value of Liabilities);      
is derivative usage for any given value,  ;   is the regression coefficient of      , and e represents the error term. 
The above equation, however, ignores many variables that can affect a firm’s Q ratio.  As previously mentioned, 
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these variables include size of the firm (SIZE), leverage ratio (LEV), profitability (ROA), investment growth 
opportunities (ING), dividend payments (DIV), geographic diversification (GEO), and industrial diversification 
(IND).  The following regression equation controls for each of these variables:   
 
                                                                                      
    
where                and   are regression coefficients.  EQ2 is the general regression equation used in Models N, 
A, B, C, D, and E where DER, DERH, DERN, DERT, DERA, and DERL replace DERX, respectively. 
 
 Each of the regression models used in this study follows the format of EQ2 but replaces DERX with a 
different proxy for derivative usage.  These proxies along with a description of the control variables can be found in 
Table 1 (All tables appear at the end of the article).  A positive relationship is expected between DERX and FV in all 
models.  That is to say, it is expected that derivative usage by non-financial firms will have a positive effect on firm 
value. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Univariate Tests 
 
 The univariate tests return surprising results, all significant at a 10% level; these are presented in Table 2.  
The average Tobin’s Q of non-users is higher than that of users.  This is true for both the smaller sample related to 
the notional values of derivatives and the larger sample related to the fair value of derivatives.  The larger sample is 
the focus of the following description and analysis.  The mean Tobin’s Q for derivative users is 1.84, while the mean 
Tobin’s Q for non-users is 2.11.  This result supports the null hypothesis and suggests that the market discounts 
derivative usage by non-financial firms.  The median Tobin’s Q for derivative users and non-users also supports a 
discount for derivative usage.  The medians suggest a 15.1% premium for non-users over users, or a 13% discount 
for derivative usage versus non-usage. 
 
 While the univariate tests suggest that derivatives are value-destroying for non-financial firms, they also 
suggest that a premium is placed on hedging derivatives over non-hedging.  Both the median and mean Tobin’s Q of 
firms that account for all of their derivatives as hedging instruments are higher than those of firms that account for 
all of their derivatives as non-hedges.  Between these two groups sits the mean and median Tobin’s Q values of 
firms that designate derivatives as both hedges and non-hedges.  This suggests that (1) designating derivatives as 
hedges is an effective signal to the market (as is not designating derivatives as hedges) and (2) the market 
values the designation of derivatives as hedging instruments.  The univariate tests do not account for variables 
other than derivative usage that are known to affect firm value.  For this reason, univariate tests are only used in a 
preliminary manner and are reported here because of the interesting implications of their results. 
 
Multivariate Tests 
 
 The multivariate tests of the notional values of firms’ derivative contracts return results contrary to those of 
the corresponding univariate test.  The multivariate tests, in general, support a positive relationship between the 
volume of derivative usage and firm value.  The positive coefficient for the DER variable, however, falls just 
outside the 10% level with a P-value of .12.  The results of Regression Model N are presented in Table 3.  To 
control for possible industry effects, the study includes dummy variables for industries (using two-digit SIC codes) 
in Regression Model N.  The results are similar to those of the original Model N with no industry variables 
contributing to firm value with statistical significance.  As a robustness test, the top five and bottom five percent of 
Tobin’s Q values are excluded from Model N.  The test returns results similar to those of the entire sample and are 
similarly statistically insignificant. 
 
 The multivariate tests for the fair values of firms’ derivative contracts return results similar to those of the 
corresponding univariate tests.  The multivariate tests of each derivative usage variable (DERD, DERN, and 
DERT) suggest a negative relationship between derivative usage as proxied by fair value and firm value.  All 
results are significant at the 1% level.  [See Table 4 for the pertinent regression results of regression models A, B, 
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and C, respectively].  Firms that use only derivatives designated as hedges are associated with the greatest decrease 
in value, followed by firms using only derivatives not designated as hedges.  These results are contrary to those of 
the univariate tests in which designated hedging derivatives were valued higher than non-designated hedging 
derivatives.  Firms using derivatives regardless of designation are associated with the smallest decrease in value. 
 
 The fair value of derivative usage was originally included in this study as a proxy for the magnitude of 
derivative usage by non-financial firms.  It was thought that, in the aggregate, the fair value of contracts would be 
proportional to the volume of derivatives usage.  It is now clear that this assumption cannot be made.  The fair value 
of derivative instruments is, however, a proxy for the position of a firm’s derivative contracts as it is determined by 
the price difference between the face value of the contract and the underlying asset.  This, in turn, proxies for the 
outcomes of a firm’s risk exposure.  A firm that has a high gross fair value (relative to the size of the firm) was 
exposed to risk that provided extreme (and unwanted) outcomes.  The prices of the underlying assets of the firm’s 
derivative contracts deviated from what it had predicted.  Analyzing regression models A, B, and C with this 
interpretation of fair values suggests that the market penalizes a firm’s value for risk exposure that results in extreme 
outcomes.   
 
 The possibility also exists that the market discounts /values the position of contracts (asset or liability) as 
opposed to unpredicted outcomes provided by the hedged risk.  To test this theory, the study divides the fair value of 
derivative contracts into those in asset positions and those in liability positions.  The general regression model is 
then used to test the relationship between derivative contracts in asset positions and firm value and derivative 
contracts in liability positions and firm value.  Both tests result in a negative significant relationship.  While the 
coefficient of the asset position variable is smaller than that of the liability position variable, the confidence intervals 
are very similar (at the 95% level); thus the market does not distinguish between derivatives in an asset position 
versus those in a liability position in determining firm value.  This suggests that investors do not discount firm 
value based on the position of its derivative contracts, which further suggests that investors do not value 
speculative derivative usage by non-financial firms. 
 
 The four multivariate regression models (N, A, B, and C) return similar results for control variables.  As 
expected, profitability (ROA) is positively and significantly related to firm value.  Size is negatively and 
significantly related to firm value.  This result was also expected and follows Allayannis and Weston [2001], 
Pramborg [2004], and Ben Khediri [2010].  Dividend payments are negatively and significantly related to firm 
value.  This result suggests that investors do not value dividends as a sign from management that the firm is 
performing well.  One possible reason for the negative relationship is that dividend payments signal a lack of 
investing opportunities.  A positive relationship between investment growth opportunities and firm value would 
have supported this theory; however the regression models do not return statistically significant results for the 
investment opportunities variable.   
 
 The remaining control variables do not demonstrate statistically significant relationships with firm value.  
The models return a negative coefficient for ING (investing growth opportunities); however the relationship is not 
statistically significant.  The unknown relationships between industrial diversification and firm value and geographic 
diversification and firm value merely support the mixed results found in the literature.  In all three models leverage 
is negatively related to firm value as is expected but, again, these results are not statistically significant.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The research question of this paper was left largely unanswered due to a lack of statistically significant 
results concerning the notional value of derivative contracts.  The power of these tests could be increased by 
increasing the size of the sample.  This study could also be improved by separating firms that are not exposed to 
risks that can be mitigated with derivative instruments from the sample.  These firms are neither valued nor devalued 
based on their non-usage of derivatives. 
 
 While it was the aim of this paper to expand the empirical research on this question, it cannot contribute 
any statistically significant results.  This paper does, however, contribute to a relatively unexplored question: does 
the position of a non-financial firm’s derivative contracts affect the value of the firm.  Concerning this question, 
there is plenty of room for further exploration.   
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 This study suggests that the market values non-financial firms whose derivative contracts have low fair 
values.  Derivative contracts with low fair values suggest that, while the firm was exposed to risks and those risks 
were hedged with derivative contracts, they did not provide the firm with “extreme” outcomes.  Uneventful or 
temperate outcomes include commodity prices, interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, etc., moving in close 
proximity to a firm’s derivative contracts.  Extreme outcomes occur when the prices of the underlying assets of 
derivative contracts do not move in close relation to the contract price.  This study suggests that the former is value-
enhancing and the latter value-destroying.  The most important implication that arises from this conclusion is that 
derivative usage may be less relevant than previous research has suggested.  Derivative instruments are used to 
manage risk exposure caused by price fluctuations of a specific asset.  The effectiveness of a derivative hedging 
contract is measured by the net gain/loss to the firm.  The closer the net gain/loss is to zero, the more effective the 
derivative contract.  According to theory, regardless of the outcome of the underlying asset, the market should value 
the derivative contract based on its effectiveness.  This paper suggests otherwise.  The outcomes of a firm’s risk 
exposure affect the value of the firm, and the hedging techniques used to mitigate that exposure are potentially 
ignored. 
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Table 1 
Variable Descriptions And Formulas 
Variable 
Type of 
variable 
Description Formula 
DER IV 
Notional value of 
derivatives (total) 
total notional value of derivative instruments
total assets
 
DERD IV 
Fair value of derivatives 
designated as hedging 
instruments 
total fair value of derivatives 
designated as hedging instruments
total assets
 
DERN IV 
Fair value of derivatives 
not designated as 
hedging instruments 
total fair value of derivatives not 
designated as hedging instruments
total assets
 
DERT IV 
Fair value of all 
derivatives (total) 
DERD + DERN 
DERA IV 
Fair value of asset 
derivatives 
 
total fair value of asset derivatives
total assets
 
DERL IV 
Fair value of liability 
derivatives 
total fair value of liability derivatives
total assets
 
FV DV Firm value, or Tobin’s Q 
                                                
                                              
 
ROA CV Profitability 
          
            
 
GEO CV 
Geographic 
diversification 
             
           
 
IND CV Industrial diversification Number of business segments that contribute to revenue 
SIZE CV Firm size                  
ING CV 
Investment growth 
opportunities 
                    
                
 
DIV CV Dividends 
Dummy variable: 1 if dividends paid during 2009    0 if no dividends 
paid during 2009 
LEV CV Leverage 
              
      
 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics From The Univariate Tests Of Fair Values 
Tobin’s Q 
 Non-Users Designated Users Non-Designated Users Users 
     
Mean 2.1140* 2.0213* 1.6596* 1.8393* 
Standard Error 0.1060 0.1174 0.1216 0.0541 
Median 1.7516* 1.6455* 1.4431* 1.5213* 
Standard Deviation 1.0914 1.1013 0.9504 0.9811 
Sample Variance 1.1913 1.213 0.9032 0.9626 
Count 106 88 61 328 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3 
Results Of Regression Model N (Notional Value Of Derivative Instruments) 
Source SS df MS 
 
Number of obs 400 
Model 197.097 8 24.63712 
 
F(  8,   425) 41.02 
Residual 234.8187 3.91E+02 0.600559 
 
Prob > F 0 
Total 431.9157 399 1.082496 
 
R-squared 0.4563 
     
Adj R-squared 0.4452 
     
Root MSE 0.77496 
FV Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DER 2.79E-06 1.79E-06 1.56 0.12 -7.30E-07 6.31E-06 
ROA 0.082621 0.0065 12.71 0 0.069842 0.095400 
GEO 0.166263 0.145588 1.14 0.254 -0.11997 0.452497 
IND -0.01533 0.020041 -0.76 0.445 -0.05473 0.024076 
SIZE -0.23987 0.036845 -6.51 0 -0.31231 -0.16744 
ING 0.141552 0.217353 0.65 0.515 -0.28577 0.568879 
DIV -0.10375 0.09522 -1.09 0.277 -0.29096 0.083453 
LEV -0.00091 0.002511 -0.36 0.717 -0.00585 0.004025 
_cons 6.949316 0.850161 8.17 0 5.277857 8.620775 
 
 
Table 4 
Partial Results Of Regression Models A, B, And C 
     
Number of obs 434 
FV Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DERD -2218.76 808.7347 -2.74 0.006 -3808.38 -629.144 
DERN -741.407 200.7858 -3.69 0 -1136.06 -346.750 
DERT -609.161 166.9997 -3.65 0 -937.409 -280.913 
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